Reduction of income inequality and subjective well-being in Europe by Hajdu, Tamás & Hajdu, Gábor
Received April 29, 2014  Published as Economics Discussion Paper May 22, 2014
Revised August 28, 2014  Accepted October 15, 2014  Published October 29, 2014
Licensed under the  Creative Commons License - Attribution 3.0
Vol. 8,  2014-35 | October 29, 2014 |  http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-35
Reduction of Income Inequality and Subjective
Well-Being in Europe
Tamás Hajdu and Gábor Hajdu
Abstract
Using four waves of the European Social Survey (179,273 individuals from 29 countries) the
authors analyze the association of reduction of income inequality by governmental taxes and
transfers (redistribution) with subjective well-being. Their results provide evidence that people
in Europe are negatively affected by income inequality, whereas reduction of inequality has a
positive effect on well-being. Since the authors simultaneously estimate the effects of income
inequality and its reduction, their results might indicate that not only the outcome (inequality),
but also the procedure (redistribution) that leads to the outcome influences subjective well-
being. Their results also show that the positive effect of redistribution is stronger for less
affluent members of the society and left-wing oriented individuals. While post-government
inequality seems to have no significant effect in Western Europe, its impact is negative and
highly significant in Eastern Europe.
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1 Introduction 
Inequality and redistribution are important topics in social sciences. Numerous 
studies have examined the impact of income inequality on various adverse societal 
outcomes, and concluded that inequality is positively associated with crime (Choe 
2008; Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Scorzafave and Soares 2009) and working hours 
(Bowles and Park 2005), negatively with health (Kaplan et al. 1996; Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2006), trust (Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Knack and Keefer 1997), 
political engagement (Horn 2011, 2008, 2010) and mobility (Corak 2013; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).1 In the presence of upward social comparison, 
greater inequality also means greater discrepancy between the aspirations and 
actual incomes of less wealthy individuals, which imposes substantial 
psychological costs on these people (Frank 2007).2 
The relationship between these outcomes and subjective well-being (Dolan et 
al. 2008; Frey and Stutzer 2002) predicts that income inequality should relate 
negatively to well-being. Besides, inequality may also shape subjective well-being 
directly, not only through these channels. Humans are social animals; we can 
empathize with other people’s misery, which means that high inequality may 
reduce our happiness even without further societal effects. Besides, the negative 
effect of inequality may result from the envy of the poor.3 
Starting with Morawetz et al. (1977), inequality has been the topic of several 
empirical papers. Studies using panel, time-series and within-country data 
document mostly negative effects in Europe (Alesina et al. 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Ramos 2010; Grosfeld and Senik 2010; Hagerty 2000; Schwarze 
and Härpfer 2007; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 2010), and in other non-
European countries as well (Oishi et al. 2011; Oshio and Kobayashi 2010).4 
_________________________ 
1  For a review, see Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 2010). 
2 In the social comparison literature range-frequency theory also predicts that increasing inequality 
affects well-being negatively (Hagerty 2000). 
3 However, a recent empirical paper found that the relationship between preference for a more equal 
society and envy is very weak (Kemp and Bolle 2013). 
4 Cross-sectional cross-country or pooled cross-sectional analyses without controlling for the cultural 
background of countries are inconclusive. Berg and Veenhoven (2010) and Helliwell and Huang 
(2008) found a positive association between income inequality and well-being, whereas in an 
analysis of European countries Fahey and Smyth (2004) reported a negative relationship. 
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Usually, people living in a more unequal environment seem to feel less happy.5 
Contrary to these results, using information from 85 countries between 1981 and 
2008 Rözer and Kraaykamp (2013) found that inequality increases well-being. 
However, the effect varies with the sample: in Europe income inequality 
negatively affects well-being. 
Determinants of preferences for redistribution are discussed in detail in the 
literature. There are several factors that have been shown to play an important role: 
self-interest (income and expected social mobility), risk-aversion (history of 
misfortune), altruism, culture and ideology, social impact of inequality, acceptable 
level of inequality, and perception of fairness (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005; Corneo and Grüner 2002; Fong 2001; Luttmer and Singhal 
2011). 
Although societal impacts of inequality, determinants of preferences for 
redistribution, and the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-
being are thoroughly studied, there is little empirical evidence about the impact of 
inequality reduction (redistribution)6 on well-being. Only one paper deals 
explicitly with the question whether the reduction of inequality by taxes and 
transfers can undo this negative impact. Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) studied how 
inequality and redistribution (reduction of inequality by the state) is associated 
with subjective well-being in Germany. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel 
they found that income inequality calculated on the regional-level has a negative 
effect on individual life satisfaction, but redistribution is not a significant 
determinant of well-being. Some redistribution-related issues were analyzed by 
other papers. Di Tella et al. (2003) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) estimate 
the effect of unemployment benefits (defined as the income replacement rate) on 
subjective well-being. Although unemployment benefits are only one component 
_________________________ 
5 Note however, that the impact of income inequality may be different in some cases. In an 
unpredictable, volatile environment inequality may be perceived as a signal of increased 
opportunities and may affect satisfaction positively (Hirschman and Rotschild 1973). For empirical 
evidence from the Eastern European transition, see Grossfeld and Senik (2010). They show that in 
the early transition period inequality was positively associated with satisfaction in Poland, but after a 
couple of years the relationship became negative.  
6 In this paper we regard ‘inequality reduction’ and ‘redistribution’ as identical. Unless noted 
otherwise, ‘redistribution’ and ‘inequality reduction’ refer to the reduction of income inequality by 
government tax and transfer policies. 
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of redistribution, we can take it as a proxy variable of the reduction of inequality. 
These papers show that a generous welfare state is positively correlated with 
satisfaction. Oishi et al. (2012) using 54 countries from the Gallup World Poll 
have found that progressive taxation is positively associated with a global-life-
evaluation index. 
In this paper we enrich the existing knowledge about the association of 
inequality reduction by governmental taxes and transfers (redistribution) with 
subjective well-being. The novelty of our paper is that it is the first to estimate the 
effect of inequality and the reduction of inequality simultaneously, not limited to 
an individual country, but using data from several European countries. The 
analysis is based on the first four waves of the European Social Survey. We 
simultaneously analyze how inequality and redistribution affect life satisfaction. 
Our results corroborate the findings of previous literature that – controlling for 
personal characteristics of the respondents, GDP, unemployment and inflation rate, 
country fixed effects and year fixed effects – people in Europe are negatively 
affected by income inequality, whereas provide new evidence that inequality 
reduction has a positive impact on well-being. Moreover, the simultaneously 
estimated effects of inequality and its reduction might indicate that it is not only 
outcome (net income inequality) that influences subjective well-being but also the 
procedure (redistribution) that leads to the outcome has a relevant impact. We 
propose four theoretical interpretations of these empirical results. We suggest that 
the poor may feel more protected, whereas the rich may feel more generous 
because of higher level of inequality reduction by taxes and transfers, which may 
result in an emotional benefit for them. It is also possible that not only actual but 
also perceived inequality is associated with well-being. Another explanation might 
be that the reduction of income inequality correlates with the generosity of the 
welfare services provided by the state, and the high level of our redistribution 
variable might capture a low level of other dimensions of social inequality 
possibly increasing life satisfaction. 
However, according to our findings, there is some heterogeneity in the effects. 
In line with the previous literature on determinants of preferences for 
redistribution, we find that the positive effect of redistribution is stronger among 
less affluent members of the society, and left-wingers. Income inequality has no 
significant effect in Western Europe, but its impact negative and highly significant 
in Eastern Europe. 
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Our paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and the 
estimation methods we used. Section 3 shows the estimation of regression models. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2 Data and Methods 
Our main data source is the four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS 
is a repeated cross-sectional survey from every other year. The first wave started in 
2002, the fourth wave was launched in 2008. We include in our analysis only those 
29 countries that participated in more than one round.7 
Our analysis relies on a self-reported measure of well-being. In the ESS-
questionnaire everyone is asked the following single-item question: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” They 
answer the question on an 11-point scale (0 – extremely dissatisfied, 10 – 
extremely satisfied). This global life evaluation is our dependent variable. 
We estimate a linear relationship between inequality reduction and 
satisfaction, using the following specification: 
 icttcictctNctctict PCIRS ελµγββββ +++++++= 3210              (1) 
where ictS  is the life satisfaction of individual i, who lives in country c in time 
(wave) t. ctR  is the measure of inequality reduction, 
N
ctI is post-government (net) 
income inequality, ctC  is the vector of country-level variables, ictP  is the vector of 
personal characteristics of individual i. We also include a country fixed effect iµ  
and a wave fixed effect tλ . Finally, the equation includes the usual error term 
( ictε ). 
In line with the literature, this paper measures income inequality by the Gini 
coefficient. The source of the inequality data is the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (Version 3.0), which provides Gini indices of gross and net 
income inequality for more than 100 countries (Solt 2009). Data of gross and net 
income inequality allow us to calculate the effect of government taxes and 
transfers on income inequality. This index of income inequality reduction by 
_________________________ 
7 The list of participating countries by ESS rounds is given in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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governmental taxes and transfers is computed as the difference between Gini 
indices based on gross and net incomes divided by gross income inequality: 
 100⋅−= G
ct
N
ct
G
ct
ct I
IIR                   (2) 
where ctR is income inequality reduction by governmental taxes and transfers in 
country c in time t (in percent), GctI  is the pre-government (gross) income 
inequality and NctI  is the post-government (net) income inequality. The inequality 
reduction index shows the percentage reduction in inequality by government tax 
and transfer policies. In other words, it measures the extent of change in income 
distribution due to governmental taxes and money transfers. This means that our 
inequality reduction variable captures policies that affect net income distribution, 
but set aside redistribution related policies that do not change net income 
inequality (e.g. in-kind transfers to the poor). 
Since Gini indices are calculated on the basis of surveys, measurement error is 
inevitable. If the variance of Gini indices and inequality reduction is mostly due to 
measurement errors rather than actual change, then our estimates would be biased. 
We try to mitigate this bias by calculating the trend values of the time series which 
capture long-term changes and set aside short-term fluctuation (which is supposed 
to be primarily the result of the measurement errors). Using inequality reduction 
and income inequality data for the last two decades, we compute trend components 
of inequality and its reduction for every country with the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(Hodrick and Prescott 1997), and we merge these trend values to the country-wave 
observations.8 
The Gini index is highest in Russia, while lowest in Sweden and Denmark. 
The reduction of inequality (redistribution) is high in the Scandinavian countries, 
Germany, and Austria and low in Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria.9 
Our other country-level right-hand side variables are the welfare of the states 
measured by Gross Domestic Product, unemployment rate, and inflation. Data on 
GDP per capita come from the World Bank (PPP, constant 2005 international $). 
In our analysis we use it in logarithmic form because of the presumed declining 
_________________________ 
8 To extract the trend from the time series of inequality and redistribution, we used the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a parameter value of 6.25 as proposed by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual 
observations. 
9 Table A2 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics by country. 
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marginal effect of income. Previous research has highlighted that each doubling of 
GDP per capita is associated with a constant increase in average well-being 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, 2013). Data on unemployment and inflation rate 
come from the World Bank as well. 
The control variables in our baseline regression are the following: gender, age, 
age squared, education (four categories), living with a partner, labor force status 
(seven categories), subjective health status (five categories), domicile (four 
categories), household size and equivalent household income. Since income 
comparison is an important determinant of subjective well-being (Clark et al. 
2008) and GDP per capita already captures the effect of the society’s average 
income, we include equivalent household income as the percentage of average 
equivalent household income in country c in time t. With this procedure we can 
control for the relative income effect. 
We exclude some countries from the fourth wave because of missing Gini 
indices,10 and individuals with missing life satisfaction. The final sample contains 
179,273 individuals and 94 country-time observations. 
We estimate OLS regressions using ESS design weights for adjusting the 
unequal inclusion probabilities within countries combined with another weight 
whose goal is to transform every sample’s N equal. In this way each cross-
sectional sample counts as the same in the analysis. The standard error estimates 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country-wave level.11 
3 Results 
Table 1 shows our baseline result. We find that redistribution and post-government 
income inequality are significant determinants of satisfaction with life. As we 
expected, the coefficient on inequality is negative: people in Europe dislike 
inequality. The coefficient on inequality reduction has a positive sign: Inequality 
reducing governmental policies are correlated positively with satisfaction. The size  
 
_________________________ 
10 These countries are Austria, Switzerland and Ukraine. 
11 Table A3 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
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Table 1: Income Inequality, Iinequality Reduction and Life Satisfaction 
 (1) 
Inequality reduction 0.036*** 
 (0.006) 
Post-government income inequality –0.051*** 
 (0.019) 
Country-level controls yes 
Individual-level controls yes 
Country dummies  yes 
Wave dummies  yes 
Adjusted R2 0.281 
N 179,273 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country-wave 
are in parentheses. Country-level controls: ln(GDP), unemployment rate, inflation. Individual-level 
controls: gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, labor force status, health, domicile, 
household size, equivalent household income (as the % of average income). Dummies are included 
for missing control variables. 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
of the coefficients means that a 1 point increase in inequality reduction is 
associated with a 0.051 point increase in well-being, while a 1 percentage point 
increase in the Gini index results in a –0.036 point lower satisfaction. Or in terms 
of per capita GDP change: a 1 percentage point increase in redistribution is 
equivalent to a 2.7 percent increase in GDP, whereas a 1 point increase in the Gini 
index is equivalent to a 3.8 percent decrease in GDP.12 
_________________________ 
12 The estimated coefficient of income inequality in the previous literature is influenced by the well-
being measure and the sample as well, thus, most of these findings are not directly comparable with 
our result. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos (2010) found that a 1 percentage point increase in the post-
government Gini index results a 0.055 decrease in life satisfaction (on an 11-point scale) in Germany 
(1997–2007). Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) found that a similar increase in the post-government Gini 
index is associated with a 0.036-0.048 lower life satisfaction (on an 11-point scale) in West-Germany 
(1985–1998). According to Alesina et al. (2004) a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini index 
decreases the proportion of ‘‘very satisfied’’ people by 0.55 percentage point and increases the 
proportion ‘‘not very/at all satisfied’’ people by 0.53 percentage point in Western Europe (1975–
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It is worth emphasizing that inequality reduction (redistribution) has a 
significant coefficient even controlling for income inequality. The first explanation 
for this result might be that it is not only the level of income inequality that 
matters, but also the process (the extent of redistribution) may lead to the 
particular outcome (Frey et al. 2004; Frey and Stutzer 2005).13 As Frey and 
Stutzer (2005) state “people get utility from living and acting under particular 
institutions over and above outcomes” (p. 92). According to our results not only 
post-government income inequality influences life satisfaction, but the difference 
between pre- and post-government inequality (which is measured by our 
redistribution variable) also matters. This variable might reflect the institutions and 
attitudes of the society. In accordance with this, individuals (especially the poor) 
may feel more protected due to higher level of inequality reduction by taxes and 
transfers; they may get the sense that the community will help them in hardship, 
irrespective of the actual inequality. It is not necessary to recognize the level of 
gross income inequality: probably solidarity and helping the poor is common talk 
in such a society, which may generate these feelings. Moreover, envying the rich 
may be less strong, thus trust among members of the society might be also higher. 
Another possible explanation for the positive coefficient on redistribution is 
that it is not – or not only – actual but also perceived income inequality is 
associated with well-being (Oshio and Urakawa 2014). If perceived inequality is 
correlated negatively with the extent of inequality reduction, then this relationship 
is reflected in the coefficient on redistribution. 
Third, the higher the income inequality reduction the more generous the 
welfare services provided by the state might be. Thus, high level of our 
redistribution variable might capture low levels of other dimensions of social 
inequality or stronger safety net. If not only income inequality but other 
dimensions of inequality are also associated with well-being, then this effect is 
reflected by the positive coefficient on the redistribution variable. 
_________________________ 
1992) (the third middle category was “fairly satisfied”). Oshio and Kobayashi (2011) found that a 
one-standard-deviation (2.7 percentage points) increase in the Gini coefficient lower the odds of 
being in the lowest happiness category (on a 3-point measure) by 8.4 percentage points, but does not 
influence the odds of being in the highest happiness category in Japan (2000–2006). 
13 If the effect of inequality and redistribution is estimated separately, the size of the coefficients is 
only slightly higher and their significance is unchanged. 
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Finally, another explanation relies on generosity and altruism. Recent studies 
demonstrate that spending money on other people and charity is associated with 
higher well-being (Aknin et al. 2013; Dunn et al. 2008). Even mandatory taxation 
for a good cause activates reward-related brain regions (Harbaugh et al. 2007). 
These results suggest that people may feel more generous because of a higher 
extent of redistribution, which may result in an emotional benefit for them, even if 
the higher level of solidarity does not depend on their decision. 
Coefficients on individual control variables correspond with earlier findings.14 
There is a U-shaped relationship between age and satisfaction. Self-reported 
satisfaction is higher for those with more education. The better people’s subjective 
health, the more likely they are to be satisfied. Living in cities has a negative effect 
on satisfaction. Those who live with a partner tend to feel more satisfied. We find 
the usual negative relationship between life satisfaction and being unemployed, 
whereas students are more satisfied than people in paid work. Women tend to 
report higher levels of well-being. Coefficients on equivalent household income 
(as the percentage of average household income) and log GDP per capita are 
positive. 
3.1 Robustness 
In the next step we examine the robustness of the baseline result. Table 2 
summarizes this analysis. Column 1 and Column 2 check whether including less or 
more control variables changes the coefficient on inequality reduction and 
inequality. In Column 1 we control only for country and wave fixed effects. In 
Column 2 we add controls for disability status, social capital (meeting with 
friends), feeling about household's income, religiousness, and minority status. In 
Columns 3 we estimate ordered probit model rather than an OLS specification. In 
Column 4 we restrict the sample to countries surveyed in at least three waves out 
of four (21 countries). Maybe redistribution and inequality need some time to have 
their full effect on subjective well-being, because they do not work only directly 
but through many channels (crime rate, trust, political engagement, etc.). To 
address this possibility, in Column 5 satisfaction in time t is regressed on  
 
_________________________ 
14 The detailed baseline regression result is in Table A4 in the appendix. 
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Table 2: Income Inequality, Inequality Reduction and Life Satisfaction, Robustness Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Only wave  
and country 
dummies 
More  
individual 
controls 
Ordered  
probit 
Only countries 
participating at 
least in three 
waves 
Lagged in- 
equality and 
redistribution 
Weighted  
by design 
weights 
Weighted by 
design weights 
× population 
weights 
Inequality reduction 0.045*** 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Post-government 
income inequality –0.052** –0.046** –0.023** –0.018 –0.036*** –0.046** –0.029* 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.339 0.073a 0.252 0.281 0.279 0.248 
N 179,273 179,273 179,273 150,549 179,273 179,273 179,273 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country-wave are in parentheses. All regressions 
include the same control variables (individual- and country-level controls, country dummies and wave dummies) as the baseline 
regression except Model 1 (only country dummies and wave dummies). More controls: disability status, social capital, feeling about 
household's income, religiousness, minority status. Dummies are included for missing control variables. 
a Pseudo R2 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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inequality and its reduction in time t-1. Finally, we weight the data using only 
design weights, which corrects for the different inclusion probabilities of 
individuals, making the samples more representative (Column 6), and combined 
design and population weights (Column 7). The latter weight ensures that every 
country is represented in proportion to its population size. Both weights are 
provided in the ESS dataset. 
The overall conclusion of the models is that the association of inequality 
reduction with life satisfaction is not altered by any of these sensitivity analyses. 
The coefficient on inequality reduction is always positive and significant at the 1 
percent level. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on income inequality is 
insignificant in one case and only marginally significant in another one; 
nevertheless, its sign always remains negative.15 In summary, robustness checks 
support the validity of our main results: we can conclude that people in Europe are 
negatively affected by income inequality, while reduction of inequality is 
associated with higher subjective well-being. 
In the next step we examine the sensitivity of our results to the measures of 
income inequality and income inequality reduction. Table A5 in the appendix 
summarizes the results. In Column 1 we use an absolute measure of income 
inequality reduction (the difference between pre-government Gini index and post-
government Gini index) instead of the percentage change. We get the same 
qualitative results as in Table 1: inequality reduction is associated positively, 
whereas income inequality is associated negatively with life satisfaction. Column 
2 shows the estimation where we use the original income inequality and 
redistribution variables instead of the smoothed trend. Both variables are 
significant at the 5 percent level, but their size is somewhat lower than the 
coefficients in Table 1. This is consistent with our expectations, since the “raw” 
variables are supposed to be measured with considerable noise, thus, the estimated 
coefficients of these variables might be biased toward zero. Column 3 includes not 
only the trend of income inequality and income inequality reduction but the 
cyclical component (short term fluctuation) as well (computed with Hodrick-
_________________________ 
15 A composition effect may explain the insignificance of coefficient on inequality in Column 4: 
most Eastern European countries are excluded from this sample because of participating in less than 
three waves. As we show in the next section, inequality has a negative effect in Eastern but no effect 
in Western European countries. 
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Prescott filter). The result clearly shows that the effect of the cyclical component is 
zero, but the effect of the trend variable remains unchanged. We think this finding 
indicate that the cyclical component indeed contains the noise caused by the 
survey measurement of Gini indices. Column 4 shows the result of the analysis 
where we compute trend component of inequality and its reduction using data for 
the years 2001–2009 (instead of the years 1990–2009). We can see that the 
estimated effects are slightly lower, but the main conclusion is not altered. Finally, 
in Column 5 pre-government income inequality is included instead of post-
government income inequality. The coefficient of pre-government Gini index is 
negative and significant. 
In addition to the robustness tests above, we examine the inequality reduction 
– satisfaction relationship on the country level (where observational units are 
countries, rather than individuals). In the country-level analysis we are able to 
examine the relationship between the change in average life satisfaction and the 
change in redistribution, income inequality, log GDP per capita, unemployment 
rate, and inflation. We estimate first- and long-differenced equations with OLS 
regression.16 
Table 3 provides the regression results, where the effects of redistribution, 
income inequality, and country-level controls are simultaneously taken into 
consideration. Column 1 shows the estimation of the first-difference regression 
without country dummies. Column 2 contains the estimation of the first-difference 
regression including country fixed effects to allow for country-specific time trends. 
Column 3 presents the result of the long-difference model. In the first-difference 
estimations, inequality seems negatively associated with life satisfaction. The size 
of the coefficients is similar or higher (in absolute term) than the result shown in 
Table 1, but some are statistically insignificant. Inequality reduction is associated 
significantly positively with well-being in Column 1. In Column 2 the estimated 
coefficients lost their significance, but the magnitude of the point estimates are 
noticeably higher than in Column 1. They are insignificant due to the imprecise 
estimation (higher standard errors), but it is not a surprise as the number of the 
estimated parameters are much higher than in Column 1 (because of the inclusion  
 
_________________________ 
16 In the long-differenced model the changes are calculated as the difference between the last and the 
first observation of every country. 
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Table 3: Income Inequality, Inequality Reduction and Life Satisfaction,  
First and Long Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 First diff. First diff. Long diff. 
ΔInequality reduction 0.040*** 0.068* 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.008) 
ΔPost-government income inequality –0.067** –0.108 –0.032 
 (0.032) (0.102) (0.028) 
Country-level controls yes yes yes 
Country dummies   yes  
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.580 0.656 
N 65 65 29 
Dependent variable: ΔLife satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country-level 
controls: Δln(GDP), Δunemployment rate, Δinflation 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
of the country dummies).17 We interpret this result as suggesting that income 
inequality reduction has a positive and income inequality has a negative but 
imprecisely estimated effect on life satisfaction. The estimations in Column 2 
mean that a 1 percentage point increase in redistribution is equivalent to a 3.8 
percent increase in GDP per capita, while a 1 point increase in the Gini index is 
equivalent to a 6.1 percent decrease in GDP per capita.18 In the long-difference 
model, inequality change has no effect on well-being, but change in redistribution 
has a significant positive impact (Column 3). 
3.2 Heterogeneity 
Previous literature reports considerable heterogeneity in preference for 
redistribution and inequality aversion. Inspired by these results, we are interested 
in the effect of inequality reduction and income inequality among different 
_________________________ 
17 In this model we have 65 observations and 34 independent variables. 
18 The estimated coefficient on the change of log GDP per capita is 1.809 in this specification (with 
country dummies). 
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subsamples and different types of individuals. We presume that association 
between inequality reduction and satisfaction should be stronger in some groups 
(Eastern Europe vs. other countries, richer vs. poorer individuals, left-wingers vs. 
right-wingers, the formerly unemployed vs. the never unemployed). After creating 
binary indicator variables for these groups, we analyze heterogeneity by regressing 
life satisfaction on redistribution and income inequality interacted with the 
relevant indicator variables. Each panel in Table 4 (from A to E) represents an 
OLS regression where the main effects of inequality and inequality reduction are 
excluded, but their interaction terms with the indicator variables are included.19 
For example, in Panel A (Eastern Europe vs. other countries) one set of inter-
actions measures the effect of inequality and its reduction in post-communist 
countries, and another set of interactions measures the effect of inequality and its 
reduction in non-post-communist countries (four interactions altogether). In this 
way, we can directly see the effect (and the significance) of redistribution and 
inequality among the examined groups of individuals. We also report the p-value 
on the test of equal redistribution/inequality coefficients.20 
Those living in post-communist countries are more likely to support the 
reduction of income inequality (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Corneo and 
Grüner 2002), so we can conjecture that the effect of inequality and its reduction 
are stronger in former communist countries. The dissimilar historical background 
might be able to explain these differences (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007). 
The decades of heavy state intervention might have a long-lasting impact on 
preferences: people in Eastern Europe may consider redistribution as more 
favorable and prefer a more equal society. An alternative explanation could rely on 
the different perceptions of opportunities. If individuals in post-communist 
countries believe that existing income inequalities are not caused by effort and 
hard work but rather by luck or connections, then they “suffer” more from 
inequality. Panel A shows that income inequality is not a significant determinant  
 
_________________________ 
19 The regressions also include the baseline control variables and the relevant indicator variables. 
20 The difference between the two coefficients is identical to the coefficient on the interaction term 
that would be estimated if the main effect (e.g. inequality reduction) and an interaction term (e.g. 
inequality reduction interacted with Eastern Europe in Panel A) would be included in the model. The 
p-value is identical to the p-value on the interaction term in such a model.  
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Table 4: Income Inequality, Inequality Reduction and Life Satisfaction, Heterogeneity 
 Inequality reduction 
Post-gov. income 
inequality 
Adjusted 
R2 N 
A)     
Eastern Europe  0.051*** -0.075*** 0.281 179,273 
 (0.014) (0.024)   
Western Europe 0.027*** –0.020   
 (0.006) (0.020)   
p-value on test of equal coefficients 0.101 0.125   
B)     
Left-wing orientation 0.037*** –0.060*** 0.285 179,273 
 (0.006) (0.021)   
Right-wing orientation 0.030*** –0.049**   
 (0.006) (0.020)   
p-value on test of equal coefficients 0.044 0.254   
C)     
Richer than country average 0.032*** -0.052** 0.282 179,273 
 (0.007) (0.021)   
Poorer than country average 0.040*** -0.056***   
 (0.006) (0.018)   
p-value on test of equal coefficients 0.018 0.627   
D)     
Lives comfortably 0.029*** –0.049** 0.293 179,273 
 (0.007) (0.020)   
Does not live comfortably 0.037*** –0.052***   
 (0.006) (0.018)   
p-value on test of equal coefficients 0.059 0.751   
E)     
Has experienced unemployment 0.040*** –0.053*** 0.285 179,273 
 (0.007) (0.018)   
Did not experience unemployment 0.037*** –0.053***   
 (0.007) (0.019)   
p-value on test of equal coefficients 0.287 0.972   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country-wave are in 
parentheses. All regressions include the same control variables (individual- and country-level controls, country 
dummies and wave dummies) as the baseline regression, plus the relevant indicator variables and their 
interactions with inequality and redistribution. 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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of well-being in Western European countries, whereas its effect is strong in 
Eastern Europe. The coefficient on inequality reduction in post-communist 
countries is almost twice as high as in other countries, but this difference just 
barely fails to be significant at the 10 percent level. 
Napier and Jost (2008) present evidence that conservatives are happier than 
liberals partly because of their greater tolerance of inequality. Alesina et al. (2004) 
report that inequality has a more negative effect on the happiness of European 
leftists. In line with these papers, we find that the effect of redistribution is 
considerably weaker among individuals with right-wing orientation. On the 
contrary, the estimated coefficient on income inequality is statistically equal 
among individuals with left-wing and right-wing orientation (Panel B).21 
Self-interest naturally influences preference for redistribution: wealthier 
individuals support less redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2005; Molnár and Kapitány 2006; Rainer and Siedler 2008) and are more 
likely to be unaffected by inequality (Alesina et al. 2004; Oishi et al. 2011). In 
Panel C we see that those with above average household incomes gain smaller 
satisfaction from inequality reduction than individuals with below average 
household incomes, whereas the estimated coefficients on inequality are not 
different statistically between the two groups. On the other hand, it is not only 
actual income (or income rank) that influences how people react to inequality and 
redistribution, but perceived income matters as well (Cruces et al. 2013). In 
Panel D we measure individuals’ material welfare with a subjective indicator: Do 
they feel that their family lives comfortably on their present income? These 
estimates show that inequality reduction has a weaker effect on respondents who 
said that they live comfortably on their present income than on those with lower 
standards of living, whereas we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal income 
inequality coefficients. The positive coefficients on inequality reduction in Panel C 
and Panel D are in line with the hypothesis that the poor might feel more protected 
_________________________ 
21 We consider as a left-wing oriented individual who on an 11-point left-right scale denotes value 
0–4, and as a right-wing oriented individual who denotes value 6–10. Individuals choosing value 5 
are coded as central orientation. In the regression beside the reported interactions we also include the 
interaction of inequality/inequality reduction with this central orientation dummy. It turns out that 
centrist individuals are affected by inequality and redistribution more than right-wingers, but less 
than left-wingers. 
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and the rich might feel more generous when inequality reduction happens to be 
higher. 
There is evidence that people with previous misfortune are more favorable to 
redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). As noted 
by e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) the experience of unemployment may 
increase risk aversion or lead to sympathizing with poorer members of society, 
which means that inequality and redistribution should have a more considerable 
effect on individuals with such experiences. Panel E shows, however, individuals 
who have ever been unemployed for a period of more than three months are 
equally affected by inequality and inequality reduction, compared to those without 
such unemployment experience. 
4 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper has been to examine the association of income 
inequality and its reduction by government taxes and transfers (redistribution) with 
individual’s subjective well-being. Using 1–4 waves of the European Social 
Survey (2002–2009), we have estimated the association of inequality and in-
equality reduction with life satisfaction. Our results are in line with the former 
evidence that income inequality is negatively related to well-being. The novelty of 
our analysis is the clear evidence that income inequality reduction has a positive 
effect on individual life satisfaction. This result contradicts the findings of 
Schwarze and Härpfer (2007), who found no relationship between regional-level 
redistribution and individual’s well-being in Germany. This discrepancy might be 
caused by the different samples and the differences of the measurement-level of 
the Gini index and redistribution. 
Previous papers on preference for redistribution and inequality aversion predict 
that the effect of inequality and its reduction is different in post-communist and in 
non-post-communist countries. Our results show that income inequality is not a 
significant determinant of well-being in Western European countries, whereas its 
effect is strong in Eastern Europe. Political orientation and self-interest seems to 
moderate the effect the inequality reduction: poorer members of society and left-
wing oriented individuals seem to be more affected by inequality reduction. 
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Since we have simultaneously estimated the effects of inequality and its 
reduction, our results suggest that subjective well-being is influenced not only by 
the outcome (income inequality), but also by the procedure (redistribution) leading 
to the outcome. Individuals (especially the poor) may feel more protected because 
of higher level of inequality reduction by taxes and transfers; they may get the 
sense that the community will help them in hardship, irrespective of the actual 
inequality. We have listed three other hypotheses to explain this result. It is 
possible that it is not (or not only) actual but also perceived income inequality is 
associated with well-being. If perceived inequality is negatively correlated with 
extent of redistribution, then this relationship might be reflected in the positive 
coefficient on inequality reduction. A positive correlation between inequality 
reduction and the generosity of the welfare services provided by the state might 
mean that high level of our redistribution variable might capture low level of other 
dimensions of social inequality. This could increase life satisfaction. Finally, 
people may also feel themselves more generous because of a higher extent of 
inequality reduction, which may result emotional benefit for them. Further 
researches are needed to verify or falsify these explanations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Countries in the Analysis by ESS Round  
Country Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Austria x x x  
Belgium x x x x 
Bulgaria   x x 
Switzerland x x x  
Cyprus   x x 
Czech Republic x x  x 
Germany x x x x 
Denmark x x x x 
Estonia  x x x 
Spain x x x x 
Finland x x x x 
France x x x x 
United Kingdom x x x x 
Greece x x  x 
Hungary x x x x 
Ireland x x x x 
Italy x x   
Luxembourg x x   
Latvia   x x 
Netherlands x x x x 
Norway x x x x 
Poland x x x x 
Portugal x x x x 
Romania   x x 
Russia   x x 
Sweden x x x x 
Slovenia x x x x 
Slovakia  x x x 
Ukraine  x x  
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Table A2: Countries in the Analysis by ESS Round  
Country Number of waves Mean LSF Mean GINI 
Mean 
REDIST Min LSF Min GINI 
Min 
REDIST Max LSF Max GINI 
Max 
REDIST 
Austria 3 7.59 26.67 45.44 7.50 26.57 44.97 7.64 26.73 45.71 
Belgium 4 7.39 25.92 33.40 7.27 25.52 32.76 7.44 26.56 34.86 
Bulgaria 2 4.56 31.12 13.04 4.41 29.30 12.88 4.70 32.95 13.21 
Cyprus 2 7.27 29.00 38.38 7.08 28.82 38.38 7.46 29.18 38.38 
Czech Republic 3 6.54 25.31 29.18 6.45 25.27 27.04 6.65 25.39 30.68 
Denmark 4 8.47 23.66 50.31 8.44 22.62 50.17 8.52 24.95 50.67 
Estonia 3 6.15 33.08 31.60 5.89 32.02 30.81 6.38 34.12 32.16 
Finland 4 7.96 25.66 47.06 7.91 25.04 46.41 8.00 26.20 47.47 
France 4 6.41 27.78 31.33 6.35 27.57 30.29 6.44 28.02 32.44 
Germany 4 6.88 28.53 46.53 6.79 27.60 46.33 6.96 29.73 46.68 
Greece 3 6.27 33.44 21.55 6.06 33.36 14.54 6.42 33.58 27.09 
Hungary 4 5.50 28.03 36.25 5.29 27.52 30.93 5.69 28.30 41.07 
Ireland 4 7.45 31.13 22.34 7.12 30.89 21.71 7.72 31.26 22.70 
Italy 2 6.71 33.77 24.16 6.51 33.77 24.08 6.91 33.77 24.23 
Latvia 2 5.97 37.67 28.41 5.88 37.49 28.04 6.06 37.84 28.78 
Luxembourg 2 7.78 27.19 35.99 7.73 27.12 35.78 7.83 27.27 36.20 
Netherlands 4 7.63 27.30 36.01 7.55 26.51 35.70 7.69 27.85 36.57 
Norway 4 7.77 24.82 46.43 7.66 24.28 46.30 7.89 25.19 46.53 
Poland 4 6.41 30.32 30.33 5.85 29.75 27.29 6.87 30.73 31.79 
Portugal 4 5.71 36.44 38.55 5.52 36.17 36.76 5.91 36.71 39.92 
Romania 2 6.00 31.96 33.44 5.85 30.83 33.28 6.14 33.09 33.60 
Russian Federation 2 5.36 45.72 5.57 5.25 45.24 5.03 5.47 46.21 6.11 
Slovak Republic 3 6.06 24.24 30.29 5.58 22.95 28.27 6.51 25.49 32.80 
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Table A2 continued 
Country Number of waves Mean LSF Mean GINI 
Mean 
REDIST Min LSF Min GINI 
Min 
REDIST Max LSF Max GINI 
Max 
REDIST 
Slovenia 4 6.84 24.83 27.65 6.57 24.62 27.38 6.97 25.22 27.94 
Spain 4 7.24 31.78 16.42 7.08 31.20 14.06 7.44 32.61 17.90 
Sweden 4 7.83 23.46 48.34 7.80 23.30 47.85 7.86 23.62 48.63 
Switzerland 3 8.06 28.48 37.02 8.01 27.60 35.59 8.10 29.35 38.17 
Ukraine 2 4.41 34.34 11.08 4.39 33.98 10.27 4.44 34.70 11.89 
United Kingdom 4 7.12 34.91 27.31 7.07 34.40 25.97 7.23 35.66 28.31 
LSF: Life Satisfaction, GINI: Post-government income inequality, REDIST: Inequality reduction 
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Table A3: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Life satisfaction 179,273 6.9 2.3 0 10 
Inequality reduction 179,273 33.2 10.9 5.0 50.7 
Post-government income inequality 179,273 29.3 4.6 22.6 46.2 
Ln(GDP) 179,273 10.1 0.4 8.6 11.1 
Unemployment rate 179,273 7.26 3.38 2.60 19.90 
Inflation 179,273 3.29 2.73 –4.48 14.11 
Age 178,208 46.0 18.2 15 100 
Female 179,044 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Equivalent household income percentage  
of the average income) 
 
140,725 
 
1.00 
 
0.95 
 
0.01 
 
52.73 
Household size 179,099 3.03 1.45 1 8 
Education: ISCED 0-1 178,337 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Education: ISCED 2 178,337 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Education: ISCED 3-4 178,337 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Education: ISCED 5-6 178,337 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Main activity: paid work 178,094 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Main activity: education 178,094 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Main activity: unemployed, looking for a job 178,094 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Main activity: unemployed, not looking for  
a job 
 
178,094 
 
0.02 
 
0.13 
 
0 
 
1 
Main activity: retired 178,094 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Main activity: housework, looking after 
children 
 
178,094 
 
0.10 
 
0.30 
 
0 
 
1 
Main activity: other 178,094 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Health: very good 179,079 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Health: good 179,079 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Health: fair 179,079 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Health: bad 179,079 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Health: very bad 179,079 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Living with a partner 177,873 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Big city 178,689 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 178,689 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Town or small city 178,689 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Village 178,689 0.39 0.49 0 1 
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Table A4: Income Inequality, Inequality Reduction and Life Satisfaction, Detailed Results 
 Coefficient SE 
Inequality reduction 0.036*** (0.006) 
Post-government income inequality –0.051*** (0.019) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.385*** (0.362) 
Unemployment rate        –0.020* (0.010) 
Inflation        –0.011 (0.008) 
Age –0.066*** (0.004) 
Age squared/100 0.072*** (0.004) 
Female –0.136*** (0.013) 
Education: ISCED 2 0.075** (0.034) 
Education: ISCED 3-4 0.116*** (0.036) 
Education: ISCED 5-6 0.269*** (0.046) 
Main activity: education 0.312*** (0.035) 
Main activity: unemployed, looking for job –1.075*** (0.051) 
Main activity: unemployed, not looking for job -0.778*** (0.066) 
Main activity: retired 0.124*** (0.024) 
Main activity: housework, looking after children –0.003 (0.025) 
Main activity: other –0.190*** (0.034) 
Living with partner 0.499*** (0.019) 
Health: very good 3.172*** (0.078) 
Health: good 2.681*** (0.072) 
Health: fair 2.006*** (0.067) 
Health: bad 1.034*** (0.070) 
Big city –0.134*** (0.026) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city –0.151*** (0.022) 
Town or small city –0.093*** (0.017) 
Equivalent household income (% of the average income) 0.170*** (0.019) 
Household size 0.027*** (0.007) 
Country dummies Yes  
Wave dummies Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.281  
N 179,273  
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country-wave are in 
parentheses. Dummies are included for missing control variables. Reference categories: Education level: ISCED 
0-1, Main activity: paid work, Health: very bad, Domicile: village/farm or home in countryside. 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A5: Income Inequality Reduction, Income Inequality and Life Satisfaction, Robustness Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Inequality reduction (trend component;  
HP filter)     0.036*** (0.006)   0.055*** (0.009) 
Inequality reduction (cyclical component;  
HP filter)     0.003 (0.009)     
Inequality reduction (absolute measure, 
 trend component; HP filter) 0.057*** (0.010)         
Inequality reduction (original)   0.030*** (0.006)       
Inequality reduction (HP trend based on  
years 2001-2009)       0.034*** (0.006)   
Post-government income inequality  
(trend component; HP filter) –0.080*** (0.017)   –0.051*** (0.019)     
Post-government income inequality  
(cyclical component; HP filter)     0.003 (0.017)     
Post-government income inequality (original)   –0.027** (0.013)       
Post-government income inequality  
(HP trend based on years 2001-2009)       –0.046** (0.019)   
Pre-government income inequality (trend 
component; HP filter)         –0.031*** (0.012) 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.280 0.281 0.281 0.281 
N 179273 179273 179273 179273 179273 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. All regressions include the same control variables (individual- and country-level controls, country dummies and wave dummies) as the 
baseline regression (Table 1). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country-wave are in parentheses. Inequality reduction (trend component; HP filter) and Post-
government income inequality (trend component; HP filter) are the same inequality and inequality reduction variables used throughout the paper. 
Inequality reduction (absolute measure) = Pre-government Gini index − Post-government Gini index. Post-government income inequality (original) and Inequality reduction 
(original) = Original values from SWID (not HP trends) 
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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